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Abstract 
This paper traces the location of foreign banks in Germany from 1949 to 2006. As 
suggested by new economic geography models we find a ‘u’-shaped concentration of 
foreign banks in Germany. Only after a competition between several cities, Frankfurt 
has emerged as the pre-eminent financial centre, triggered by the ‘historical event’ of 
setting up the German central bank in Frankfurt. After a strong increase, Frankfurt’s 
share in the location of foreign banks in Germany decreases slowly but significantly 
since the mid 1980’s. We conclude that there will be a lesser role in Europe for second-
tier financial centres in the future. 
 
Keywords: financial centres, ‘u’-shape, foreign banks, Frankfurt 
JEL-Codes: R11, N94 1  Introduction 
The paper traces the location of foreign banks in Germany from 1949 to 2006 with special 
emphasis on the evolution of the financial centre Frankfurt. Frankfurt’s development is a 
special case: It is not, as many other major financial centres, the predominant centre in its 
country since ages. Instead, it gained this position in Germany after a competition between 
Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Frankfurt and others in the 1950’s and 1960’s – starting virtually 
from a level playing field after World War II. Berlin has been the leading financial centre 
before but could not continue that role. These circumstances create a unique opportunity for 
a thorough examination of the process of financial centre formation and for testing 
theoretical predictions regarding the emergence and development of financial centres. We 
find that an ‘historical accident’ – the set up of the predecessor of the Bundesbank close to 
the American military headquarters – triggered Frankfurt’s development as the predominant 
financial centre in Germany. Subsequently, the largest German privately owned banks and 
most foreign banks settled in Frankfurt. Since the mid 1980’s, however, Frankfurt’s share 
in foreign banks’ location in Germany declines – much in line with the ‘u’-shaped 
development of industry agglomerations suggested by the New Economic Geography 
literature. This trend is not due to banks settling in Berlin after the German reunification but 
rather to a general dispersion throughout Germany. The case of foreign banks in Germany 
is one of the rare opportunities where a ‘u’-shaped locational pattern of industry 
development can be observed. Due to a simultaneous concentration process of investment 
banking business on a European scale, Frankfurt is losing banks and business also to 
London.   
So far, each nation in Europe has developed a financial centre in which the majority of 
financial action takes place, e.g. London – one of the leading international financial centres 
and by far the biggest in Europe – Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Milan, Paris and Zurich. With 
Europe becoming more and more unified economically and politically, a common currency, 
far-reaching common regulatory harmonization and the advent of ever more sophisticated 
information and communication technologies, the question of further development for 
Frankfurt and other European financial centres emerges. McKinsey, a consultancy, even 
raised the question whether there will be a financial centre in Germany at all (McKinsey 
2003). A concentration process within the European Union similar to that observed in 
different countries in the past would mean a severe loss in significance for most European 
national financial centres.  
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Against this background the paper addresses the specific questions: Which factors are 
relevant for the emergence of Frankfurt to the predominant financial centre in Germany 
after World War II? How did Frankfurt’s attractiveness for foreign banks develop over 
time? And, what are the forces that shape the development of Frankfurt and other financial 
centres in the future? So far, theoretical approaches about the dynamic formation – or 
demise – of financial centres are not very well elaborated; the paper tries to fill this gap. It 
is organized as follows: After a short survey of the existing – mostly static – literature on 
financial centres in chapter 2, we derive hypotheses for the development of financial 
centres from the new economic geography approach and from evolutionary economics in 
chapter 3. The data and methods used are described in chapter 4; chapter 5 then analyses 
the development of Frankfurt with regard to the hypotheses. Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
2  Literature on financial centres 
Financial centres are among the most visible industry agglomerations. Due to the fact that 
they do not need natural resources for their production process, these concentrations of 
activity in specific locations are enigmas which need to be explained. While the emergence 
and development of financial centres is rarely the subject of analysis, the static 
phenomenon of financial centres – i.e., why and where financial centres do exist – has been 
discussed in two distinct research strands (see Tschoegl 2000 for an extensive survey): On 
the one hand the agglomeration forces that draw actors together are examined on a micro-
level and on the other hand the factors that lead to the emergence of financial centres in 
specific countries are analyzed from a macro-economic perspective. 
On a micro level, financial centres, like other agglomerations, are considered to be the 
result of both centripetal and centrifugal forces. Centrifugal forces appear to be of minor 
importance given the ongoing centralization of financial activities (Sassen 1999). Gehrig 
(1995) actually asserts that financial literature should rather ask why all economic activity 
is  not concentrated only in one single location. By extending classical Marshallian 
externalities and adapting them to financial centres, Porteous (1999) provides a fairly 
exhaustive list of external economies, i.e. centripetal forces. He cites labour market 
externalities, intermediate services, technological and informational spillovers, and socio-
institutional and cultural factors as specific agglomeration economies within the financial 
sector. Thrift (1994) argues that, despite new communication technologies, physical 
proximity to other firms remains crucially important within the financial sector. The ‘need 
for information, for the expertise that allows that information to be interpreted and for the 
social contacts that generate trust, information, interpretive schemes – and business – is   3
paramount’ (Thrift 1994, 334). Accordingly, social and cultural structures within the 
financial community (‘social embeddedness’) determine the economic success of financial 
centres. 
Knowledge about the needs of spatially dispersed clients are generally regarded as the main 
centrifugal factor: ‘[...] physical proximity to the customer is important for three 
consecutive stages of establishing a position in a foreign market, viz. (1) obtaining 
knowledge of the local market, (2) establishing personal contact with clients; and (3) 
supporting existing relations’ (Ter Hart and Piersma 1990, 85). Ter Hart and Piersma focus 
on the determinants for physical, or spatial, proximity in financial sectors with respect to 
the requirements of financial transactions: the intensity of face-to-face-contact, the 
importance of contact rapidity and intensity, the scale of transaction, and acquaintance with 
the other party. They also provide a list of banking transactions, ranked according to their 
sensitivity to spatial proximity. The more complex and individual the transaction, the more 
spatial proximity to customers is needed and the less concentrated financial activities are 
(Ter Hart and Piersma, 1990; see Lee and Schmidt-Marwede 1993). Clark and O’Connor 
(1997) divide financial products into three categories - transparent, translucent and opaque, 
based primarily on the information type and specificity required in order to trade in each 
product. The more localized (or tacit) knowledge is necessary for handling a product, the 
less concentrated financial activities will be. They suggest that opaque products tend to be 
traded in sub-national centres, translucent products mainly in national centres and 
transparent products in global financial centres. From a dynamic point of view, this leads to 
the conclusion that – ceteris paribus – the more products are independent of specific 
localized knowledge (or the more they are standardized), the more concentrated financial 
activity becomes.  
The advent of new information and communication technology as a major force in the 
financial sector has had ambiguous effects on financial centres by allowing for the 
concentration of activities on the one hand and by increasing mobility on the other (O’Brien 
1992). Standardized transactions requiring minimal interaction between financial actors 
(transaction processing, for example) can be concentrated in one place, and then shifted to 
any location. These activities often do not rely on specific skill sets and therefore easily 
migrate towards peripheral locations (Walter 1998; Grote and Täube 2006). While 
information and communication technologies can be used to split up production processes 
and thus increase mobility, proximity – not only spatial, but also cultural, organizational 
and professional – remains essential for the financial industry (Grote et al. 2002). 
Many macro-oriented studies have been triggered by Reed’s (1981) pioneering work. The 
factors that determine the location of a financial centre are analyzed by cross-country   4
regressions of national characteristics. Reed looks at 40 ‘home nation variables’ to explain 
the presence of a financial centre in a country; the most important variable is the number of 
telegrams to and from that country. The main macro-economic variable is the cumulative 
net-investments and other capital exports, however ‘[t]he impact of being a net exporter of 
capital on centre status is not exactly clear’ (Reed 1981, 51 and 43-48). Goldberg, Helsley 
and Levi (1988, 86) found the following variables to be influential in the emergence of an 
international financial centre: ‘1) the level of overall economic development; 2) the level of 
international trade; 3) the extent of financial intermediation; and 4) the stringency of 
financial regulation.’ Contrary to that, Fattouh (2000) finds that, when controlling for 
offshore centres, differences in regulation and tax regimes do not explain the locational 
choices of banks in financial centres. In three consecutive studies (1986, 1996 and 2002), 
Choi, Tschoegl and Yu examine the determinants of interpenetration of financial centres by 
banks, mainly by looking at the offices of banks in other financial centres. Over the years, 
the explaining variables do not change much: They reach the conclusion that ‘[t]he 
attractiveness of a centre is clearly related to the size of the economy it represents, and 
perhaps to the amount of international financial activity there’ (Choi/Tschoegl/Yu 1986, 
61). However, these studies regress mostly on financial data for the whole country instead 
of indicators on a city level – thus explaining the size of the financial sector but not the size 
of a specific centre (e.g., Fattouh 2000, Choi/Tschoegl/Yu  1986; Choi/Park/Tschoegl 
1996). A major measure of the attractiveness of a centre is the number of banks already 
located in the country (Choi/Park/Tschoegl 2002, see also Jeger/Haegler/Theiss 1992). A 
related strand set up by Reed analyzes the hierarchical structure of the international 
financial centre network (Poon 2003; Poon/Eldredge/Yeung 2004) much in the spirit of the 
world city research (Friedmann 1995) as well as the links between those centres (the 
‘Loughborough School’, Beaverstock et al. 2006; Faulconbridge 2004; Beaverstock et al. 
2001). 
While such studies have helped to understand which countries might develop financial 
centres of international importance and the links between them, they have not told us very 
much about the dynamics of this development. The fact that there are so little common 
macro variables that explain the emergence of an international financial centre hints to 
some hidden, dynamic mechanisms behind the macro-economic facts. Furthermore, the 
literature merely touches on the issue of how a specific city becomes a country’s leading 
financial centre; this is also true for studies dealing with the development of a specific city 
over time, like those of Reed (1980), Smith (1984) and the Economists Advisory Group 
(1984).  
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3  Dynamic approaches and hypotheses  
Two basic theories offer themselves to cope with dynamic developments of 
agglomerations: The new economic geography, brought forward by Paul Krugman and 
others, and the ‘path dependence’ concept taken from evolutionary economics. So far, these 
concepts are not applied in empirical research on financial centres; an early study by 
Kindleberger (1974) being the exception. He describes the development of the leading 
financial centres in several countries and stresses the gradual movement of banks into these 
centres. This dynamics creates – in ‘an evolutionary and time-consuming process’ 
(Kindleberger 1974, 67) – external economies of scale that firmly bind banks and other 
financial institutions to a chosen location. The new evolutionary concepts and new 
economic geography models are regarded as a valuable tool in research on locations 
(Boschma and Lambooy 1999, Lambooy and Boschma 2001, Porteous 1999). We take an 
eclectic mix of both paradigms to frame the changing locations of foreign banks in 
Germany. While there is no formal modelling and an emphasis on the evolution of the 
institutional settings over time – clearly within the evolutionary framework – hypotheses 
about the decline of Frankfurt as the most important location for foreign banks in Germany 
are taken from the new economic geography (henceforth NEG). This approach is similar to 
Boschma and Frenken (2006) who recently argued in favour of an ‘Evolutionary Economic 
Geography’ that tries to incorporate much of both strands. 
Financial centres, like other agglomerations, are considered to be the result of both 
centripetal and centrifugal forces within the new economic geography approach.  
‘Will the financial services sector maintain its current polycentricity, or will it 
concentrate in London (or Frankfurt)? These are questions about industrial 
clustering; and they are questions that can, we believe, usefully be addressed using 
our basic approach to economic geography’ (Fujita/Krugman/ Venables 1999, 283).  
Generally, for the centripetal forces the classic Marshallian sources of external economies 
of scale are used, i.e. a liquid labour market, linkages and pure technological spillovers. For 
the centrifugal forces there are immobile factors, increasing rents and negative 
technological effects. However, for analytical work, usually the models focus on one 
centrifugal and one centripetal force and on the tension between them (Krugman 1998). 
Both, models of the NEG and the concept of path dependence display a dynamic process, 
which David (1997) terms ‘cumulative causation’. After a small inequality is introduced 
between formerly identical locations – by an ‘historical accident’ that is outside the 
explanatory scope of any model – one location gets more attractive than the other and 
displays self-reinforcing features in attracting business.   6
  The emergence of Frankfurt as an international financial centre may be effectively 
analyzed within any dynamic framework only if the process was, in fact, a process based on 
cumulative causation. Frankfurt could also have evolved as a major financial centre due to 
other, simpler reasons: its central location in Germany (and in Europe), its large 
international airport, the presence of the Bundesbank and today the ECB, its surrounding 
industries and wealthy individuals, etc. All this could have made Frankfurt attractive 
enough to draw a large number of financial firms. Therefore the first hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: The development of financial centres is largely influenced by 
external effects to scale.  
Arthur (1994) offers an evolutionary path dependence model that shows how a specific 
location can rise above others if external (or agglomeration) economies prevail. In terms of 
the discussion here, Arthur shows that a financial centre with a small, ‘accidental’ or 
historical advantage for a specific type of financial business attracts more banks to do that 
specific type of business, and this, in turn, makes the location even more attractive for other 
banks. Such increasing returns to scale favour a geographic ‘lock-in’, or making one 
location superior to others. With increasing returns, the starting point of this process is of 
crucial importance: The location that ‘naturally’ best suits the needs of companies is not 
necessarily the one that will become the leading financial centre. If the agglomeration 
economies outweigh the ‘natural’ location factors (clients, infrastructure, etc.), any location 
that just happens to initially attract more banks can end up as the predominant financial 
centre. Also in NEG models historical events are necessary to start any agglomeration or 
concentration process. In order to determine which circumstances actually triggered the 
emergence of a predominant financial centre, it is necessary to closely examine the early 
history of its development: 
Hypothesis 2: Small historical events after World War II determine the 
development of competing financial centres in Germany. 
One major outcome is featured by most of the NEG models (Neary 2001), the ‘u-curve’ or 
‘inverted u-curve’. The basic setting is as follows: There are two identical countries, each 
with two sectors, usually termed manufacturing and agriculture. In the case of high 
transportation costs – understood here in the broad sense communication costs (see 
Fujita/Krugman/Venables 1998, 98) – production of manufactured goods is divided equally 
between the two countries (right side of figure 1 below). Production has to stay close to the 
customers due to high transportation costs; no industrial concentration occurs. Thus, the 
figure is to be read from the right to the left. The gradual reduction of transportation costs 
leads to agglomeration: Since manufacturing firms use their output as each other’s input, it   7
now pays off to be close to each other. However, wages rise in the region where the 
industry is located. As transport costs decline further, the wage effect becomes relatively 
more important and industry again is dispersing (see, e.g., Fujita/ Krugman/ Venables 1999, 
256-259).  
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Figure 1: share of manufacturing sector in both regions depending on the level of transport 
costs 
Source: Fujita / Krugman / Venables 1999, 257 
 
 
This ‘u’-shaped respectively inversed ‘u’-shaped relationship between the level of 
agglomeration and transport costs is a fairly general phenomenon of the NEG (see Tabuchi 
and Thisse 2001, Tabuchi 1998, Puga 1999, Brülhart 1998, Junius 1996) and forms the 
basis for the third hypothesis. There will be, however, no formal estimation of the model’s 
parameters as, e.g., in Brakman et al. (2006) or Pires (2006) for estimating the ‘free-ness of 
trade’ and the wage structure, respectively. The NEG model, or rather this class of models, 
does not lend itself easily to empirical tests for single industries: In the setting here there 
are more than just two opposing financial centres but only one industry; long-term data 
about wages are not available on a regional basis, and the ‘transportation’ costs are hard to 
translate into different financial products (see McCann 2005 for a discussion of the 
assumed ‘iceberg’-transportation costs in NEG models). Therefore, we rather use the NEG 
to formulate an ‘appreciative hypothesis’ (see Nelson 1994) as guidance for research rather 
than to test any model specifications:    8
Hypothesis 3: The concentration of financial actors exhibits an inverted ‘u’-shaped 
pattern in time, i.e. first an increasing concentration in one financial centre and than 
a dispersion of actors in space. 
The NEG has received much criticism that is not replicated here (Martin and Sunley 1996; 
Martin 1999; see Boschma and Frenken 2006 for a recent overview). NEG models use 
linkages between firms as agglomeration factor – and not spillovers, as most of the 
literature on financial centres does – and ignore all others, mostly because the former are 
easy to model (Fujita et al. 1999, 5; see Ottaviano and Puga 1998; Martin 1999 and Neary 
2001 for critique). Nevertheless a ‘u’-shape concentration is a testable hypothesis about the 
decline of financial centres – or any agglomeration – over time. Evolutionary approaches 
do not have a similar unambiguous prediction about the possible decline of a once 
successful agglomeration. To infer, however, from the finding of a ‘u’-shaped development 
that the mechanisms postulated by proponents of the New Economic Geography determine 
the developments of financial centres might be a wrong deductive conclusion. Instead we 
discuss the possibly changing nature of the agglomeration- and disagglomeration effects 
below. 
 
4  Data  
The presence of many banks at one place itself is not a confirmation of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms or path dependence. A path dependent process can be assumed when the 
locational choice of a bank depends on the presence of other banks. Hypothesis 1 is tested 
with interviews – taken from former research projects – with bankers in Frankfurt who 
were asked for their reasons to be located in the city. To analyze whether Frankfurt’s 
emergence as the pre-eminent location for foreign banks is determined by ‘small historical 
accidents’ that are almost per se not reflected in any indicators, we examine the historical 
context of Frankfurt’s development to test for hypothesis 2. This is done by reviewing 
recent literature on the German financial system, banks’ history as well as historical 
sources.  
The main focus of this paper is on the ‘u’-shaped concentration pattern of foreign banks in 
Germany, so a closer look on this indicator is in order. The German financial system has 
since long been – and to a large extent still is – a bank-based system. Firm financing 
depends to large portion on loans from banks rather than on capital markets (Schmidt and 
Tyrell 2004). 60 percent of all banks belong to the co-operative sector (12 percent of 
domestic bank assets) and about 20 percent of the number of banks belongs to the savings 
banks sector (accounting for 35 percent of domestic bank assets). The private banking   9
sector, of which foreign banks are a sub-group, consists of a mere 12 percent of all banks in 
Germany and holds about 30 percent of all domestic assets, the others being specialized 
banking institutions (Hackethal 2004). Legal and statutory restraints in the case of savings 
and co-operative banks and comparatively high sunk costs restrict the locational decisions 
of domestic banks in such a way that they are not likely to move. Therefore, the presence of 
foreign bank headquarters is regarded in most studies on the location of financial activity as 
one of the most reliable indicator. Of course, financial centres cannot be adequately 
captured with only one measure (see Porteous 1999 for an extensive list of potential 
indicators). Many other indicators, however, turned to be of less relevance with the advent 
of the new telecommunication technologies. For instance, the turnover of Deutsche Börse, 
the Frankfurt based main German stock exchange, is driven to more than 50 percent by 
participants from outside Germany via remote access. Most of them are located in London; 
it is at least questionable whether one can attribute this turnover to the financial centre 
Frankfurt. We acknowledge that our approach does not fully capture the development of 
different financial centres. Nevertheless, the focus here is on the location of foreign banks 
as such and the use of their location gives insight into the spatial evolution of Germany’s 
financial system. 
We use a hand collected database that builds on data from the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
especially the ‘Verzeichnis der Kreditinstitute’ (list of credit institutions), a register of 
banks that has been published every couple of years in the past and is now published 
regularly. The database includes the date of entry, location and exit of every foreign bank 
that has operated in Germany since World War II, according to country of origin and form 
of presence. The data starts in 1949 for subsidiaries and branches and in 1955 for the 
representative offices. The latest figures are available for 2006. Observations are made 
roughly every four years until the mid-1980’s, and more frequent since then. The 
Bundesbank did not register foreign subsidiaries as foreign banks prior to 1996; therefore a 
number of other sources had to be consulted as well. These consist of sporadic surveys in 
the ‘Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen’ (the journal for all credit institutions), reports 
from different banks’ associations, other Bundesbank reports, and newspaper articles. 
There are minor deviations in the number of foreign banks listed by different sources (as 
well as by different Bundesbank sources) for a given year, most likely due to differing 
definitions of the term ‘foreign bank’. These deviations are concentrated in the years before 
the 1980’s and do not affect the results qualitatively. Financial institutions that are not fully 
licensed, such as mortgage banks, building and loan associations and investment trusts have 
been excluded, although the Bundesbank lists them as foreign ‘financial institutions’ since 
recently. Some clarifications regarding different forms of foreign banking establishments 
are in order. The database lists representative offices, branches and subsidiaries of fully   10
licensed foreign banks. ‘Subsidiaries’, according to German law, are banks in which at least 
50 percent of the capital belongs to foreign owners. ‘Branches’ of foreign banks are 
establishments that are legally dependant on foreign banks. Both are treated equally in the 
analysis. ‘Representative offices’ of foreign banks in Germany are not authorized to do any 
banking business. These predominantly small units (usually with a headcount of three to 
ten) serve primarily to facilitate contact between German clients and other banks resident in 
Frankfurt on the one hand and their respective headquarters on the other. Different legal 
establishments of the same bank are recorded as two entries, since they may be located in 
different cities. For instance, Citigroup today is located in Dusseldorf with its private 
clients operations and in Frankfurt with its investment banking business in two different 
legal entities and is therefore recorded twice. Each bank – regardless of the form of its 
presence – may have up to hundreds of offices which are not recorded.   
 
5  Results 
Traditionally there have been several significant financial centres in Germany, each with its 
own stock exchange, significant regional banks and other financial institutions (Klagge and 
Martin 2005). Frankfurt is the pre-eminent financial centre ranked as a ‘tier 2’ international 
financial centre after London and New York (Poon 2003). Today, 12 of the 30 largest 
German banks measured by balance sheet volume have their head offices in Frankfurt, 
another two are headquartered in Mainz and Wiesbaden, respectively. The Rhein-Main-
region, therefore, has the highest concentration of major banks in Germany, with a share of 
more than 55 percent of the 30 largest banks’ balance sheet total. When only privately 
owned banks are taken into account – these do not have any locational restrictions – that 
share increases to 68 percent (source: Association of German Banks 2005, own 
calculations). Moreover, Frankfurt has the highest concentration of resident capital 
investment companies in Germany, with more than 52 percent of the reported companies. 
Foreign banks, although relatively small in terms of balance sheet volume, enjoy a general 
advantage with respect to activities that had previously been heavily regulated or 
underdeveloped in Germany. For instance, foreign banks’ market share in mergers and 
acquisitions advisory is consistently above 75 percent in the last years. 
Agglomeration effects 
The agglomeration of banks in Frankfurt could be brought about by external increasing 
returns to scale in financial centre development or by external advantages of Frankfurt. The 
latter could be its central location, the location of the Bundesbank, the airport, etc. 
Increasing returns to scale, however, would reflect in the other banks being the major   11
location factor for banks. Grote (2002) reports the results of in-depth interviews conducted 
with top executives of Frankfurt’s foreign banks. The bankers were asked why they are 
located in Frankfurt. The most important locational factors cited were directly associated 
with the size of the financial centre, namely the location of big German banks and the 
contacts to other bankers. Five additional factors cited – ‘interbank payments’, ‘image’, 
‘qualified staff’, ‘specific financial services’ and ‘the stock exchange’ – are also related to 
the size of the financial centre. In short, banks are located in Frankfurt because other banks 
are too. This is exactly what a path dependent process with underlying increasing returns to 
scale would reflect. The high degree of spatial proximity among banks in Frankfurt’s 
financial district lends additional support to the conclusion. Banks are not located next to 
the Bundesbank office but rather close to one another, despite that fact that Frankfurt’s 
inner city rents are the highest in Germany (figure 2). Note that the European Central Bank 
is about to move out of the city centre, almost as far away as the Bundesbank once did, but 
in another direction.  
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Figure 2: The spatial pattern of financial institutions in Frankfurt 
Source:  Grote (2002) 
 
Banks’ spatial proximity to the trading floor of the stock exchange does not hinder the 
increasing returns to scale argument as the stock exchange is not a gravitation point in and   12
of itself. Rather its attraction is based on the many people doing business on the exchange, 
which in turn attract more traders, and so on. Furthermore, the trading floor is much less 
important than before; a couple of years ago Deutsche Börse has moved its headquarters to 
a suburb (not depicted on the map). In short, banks locate close to each other. The location 
of banks is in line with hypothesis that Frankfurt’s position today is based on a path-
dependent development.  
When it all started: Small historical events 
Before 1870, Frankfurt was the predominant German financial centre, but lost this position 
to Berlin for a variety of reasons (Harrschar-Ehrnborg 2000). Berlin served as Germany’s 
main financial centre from the time it succeeded Frankfurt in this capacity until World War 
II. After the war, however, Berlin was unable to retain this role, due primarily to Soviet 
politics and the threat of Soviet invasion. In this context, the American and British 
governments decided to base the ‘Bank deutscher Länder’, which preceded the 
Bundesbank, in western Germany. Hamburg and Frankfurt were promising candidates, as 
were, to a lesser degree, Cologne and Dusseldorf. After the war, much was in favour of 
Hamburg: the largest non-Berlin offices of many banks were located in Hamburg (one 
major German bank – the Commerzbank – even had its head office in Hamburg); parts of 
the Reichsbank have been moved to Hamburg before; the turnover volume of its stock 
exchange was greater than that of all other German stock exchanges combined; most 
foreign payments were cleared in Hamburg and on top it had suffered relatively less 
destruction than other cities during the war and so could provide office space necessary for 
banking (Holtfrerich 1999; see Brakman/Garretsen/Schramm 2004).  
At the same time Dusseldorf, with its large industrial hinterland (‘Ruhrgebiet’), controlled a 
major share in domestic credit activities (Wolf 1998a). In 1948 the three major German 
banks – Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank – had been split into ten 
separate banks, one in each state (‘Land’). In 1950 the Dusseldorf division of Deutsche 
Bank controlled almost 40 percent of the balance-sheet total of all Deutsche Bank Group, in 
contrast to the mere 9 percent controlled by the Frankfurt division. For the balance sheets of 
the split-banks of the three big German banks that were located in the competing centres, 
the following picture emerges: 
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  Dusseldorf Hamburg  Frankfurt  Sum of all split-banks 
of each group 
Deutsche Bank  891  206  213  2274 
Dresdner Bank  449  208  249  1357 
Commerzbank 450  134  68  892 
Sum 1790  548  530  4523 
 
Table 1: Balance sheets of split-up banks of former German large banks at  
31st May 1950 (in million DM) 
Source: Wolf 1998a 
 
 
Dusseldorf occupied a similar predominant position in the savings banks’ sector (Wolf 
1998b). However, due to special interests of the allied forces in the industrial area 
Ruhrgebiet, it was put under special administration (the so-called ‘Ruhrstatut’). The allied 
forces were still debating whether the mighty steel industry should be moved out of 
Germany; this debilitated Dusseldorf, the financial centre of the Ruhrgebiet, to a great 
extent (see Hansmeyer 1998). Frankfurt, with its central location in West Germany, its 
large airport and – most significantly – the headquarters of the American military 
government, was chosen as the location for the German Central Bank in 1948. The decision 
was taken against the British and French suggestion, Hamburg. The final motives remain 
unclear (Holtfrerich 1999), but it seems reasonable to assume that the US forces wanted to 
have the central bank in close vicinity in their sovereign territory. Other special state-owned 
banks were set up in Frankfurt after 1948 as well, including banks for agricultural and 
housing financing. Of these, the most important was the Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (‘Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau’), which distributed the funds of the 
Marshall plan. These primarily political decisions were the ‘historical accidents’ that paved 
the way for Frankfurt’s evolution as Germany’s predominant financial centre. 
In subsequent years, the parent organization of Germany’s credit unions, and some other 
private banks from Berlin relocated to Frankfurt, while the parent organization of 
Germany’s savings banks based itself in Dusseldorf in 1950, only to relocate to Frankfurt in 
1965 (Holtfrerich 1999). In 1952, the three major banks were allowed to combine their ten 
divisions into three banks, and in 1957 a total recentralization was permitted. Dresdner and 
Deutsche Bank immediately located most of their headquarter functions in Frankfurt, while   14
Commerzbank – with its headquarters in Hamburg (!) – moved to Dusseldorf in 1958. 
Beginning in the 1970’s, however, Commerzbank gradually shifted its headquarter 
functions to Frankfurt. The Union-owned Bank (‘Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft’) also moved 
to Frankfurt in 1958. The primary attraction in Frankfurt at that time was the Central Bank. 
Banks that refunded themselves with funds from the money market had to be close to the 
institution with the power to alter market conditions and provide liquidity. Written 
messages from banks to the Central Bank – and vice versa – had to be transported by 
messenger, and the payment system relied heavily on paper exchange. These factors all 
made it inevitable that major German banks would headquarter themselves in Frankfurt 
(Holtfrerich 1999). This explanation is supported by the fact that institutions that did not 
need daily contact with the money market (primarily mortgage banks) did not relocate to 
Frankfurt. In fact, only one of the 15 largest mortgage banks was located in Frankfurt in 
1958 (Wolf 1998b). 
Concentration of foreign banks 
Figure 4 below displays the pre-dominance of the financial centre Hamburg after World 
War II, with up to 50 percent of foreign banks located there (although on a low total level). 
For the sake of clarity, only the most important locations are displayed in the following 
graphs, i.e. Hamburg, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf and Cologne. The share of the total number of 
foreign banks in Germany per city is shown on the left ordinate. Additionally, the number 
of business-conducting foreign banks (i.e., branches and subsidiaries, but no representative 
offices) in Germany is measured on the right vertical axis (figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in Germany  
(shares per financial centre and total number) 
Source: own database 
 
 
The break in recorded foreign banking presence in the largest German centres in 1953 
resulted from the rise of ‘other locations’ at the time. Bank deutscher Länder’s statistics 
from that year classify the numerous, dispersed special banks of the American military as 
foreign banks as well. In the early 1960’s then many banks with headquarters throughout 
Germany either established offices in Frankfurt or acquired Frankfurt-based privately 
owned banks, primarily in order to do business with Frankfurt’s stock exchange (Der 
Volkswirt 1968). In this way, Frankfurt established itself as the most attractive financial 
centre for domestic banks; subsequently, it also attracted the majority of foreign banks 
entering Germany. Since the end of the 1960’s, the majority of foreign banks entering 
Germany have based themselves in Frankfurt, after receiving treatment similar to domestic 
banks with the implementation of the Banking Law (‘Kreditwesengesetz’) in 1962. 
Between 1960 and 1971, the market share of foreign banks in Germany rose fourfold, to 
about 4 percent, and, by the end of this period, the world’s 15 largest banks (60 percent of 
which were American) had offices in Germany. In those days, the primary reason for 
establishing a presence in Germany was to advise different domestic firms as they went 
abroad (Kindleberger 1983).  
International liquidity (the ‘petrodollars’) began to rise sharply in the 1970’s; many foreign 
banks came to Frankfurt in part because it had the best access to the German payment   16
settlement system, but also in order to do business on Frankfurt’s stock exchange. By the 
end of this period, Frankfurt had become the home of about two-thirds of all the foreign 
bank branches and subsidiaries in Germany. This pattern has been remarkably stable: while 
the number of business-conducting units of foreign banks rose from approximately 40 to 
180 between 1973 and 2000, Frankfurt’s market share has remained more or less 
unchanged (Figure 4). The graph displays the fact that Dusseldorf did not play a role as a 
location for foreign banks after WWII. Only in the 1970’s the city with its large Japanese 
community gained prominence for Japanese banks, but is not relevant in terms of foreign 
banks’ presence today. Starting in the mid-1990’s and accelerating since 2003, however, 
Frankfurt’s share in the number of subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks in Germany 
is declining. In 2006 the share drops below 60 percent for the first time since 1973 – 
although the total number of foreign banks in Germany is rising again. This is not matched 
by any gain of Hamburg, Cologne, Dusseldorf or any other centre not depicted above.  
The representative offices show a different picture. The emerging importance of Frankfurt 
is displayed early by the location behaviour of representative offices – which are indeed 
used in the literature as an early indicator (figure 4). Since the recording of Bundesbank 
started in 1955 almost three quarters of representative offices are located in Frankfurt – also 
very constant up to the late eighties, even when the total number changes dramatically.  
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Figure 4: Representative offices 
Source: own database   17
In contrast to the development in branches and subsidiaries, Frankfurt’s share of German 
representative offices declined markedly during the 1990’s. At that time it was primarily 
due to the new relevance of Berlin: The noticeable amount of representative offices – up to 
25 in the mid nineties – have been the legacy of East Berlin as the former capital of the 
German Democratic Republic. Most of these offices are from Eastern European countries, 
especially from Russia. This actually raised some fears in Frankfurt at that time about 
Berlin as a coming rival, but a switch of banks’ locations did not materialize. Today Berlin 
does not play a role at all as a location for foreign branches and subsidiaries, and the 
number of representative offices came down to six. Nevertheless, Frankfurt’s share in 
representative offices is declining further, mostly due to the fact that Frankfurt lost 
relatively more than other locations in the downsizing of the representative offices’ 
presence in Germany. 
To examine whether Frankfurt’s attractiveness for foreign banks in Germany follows a ‘u’-
shape we construct an index to incorporate the different forms of foreign banks’ presence in 
Germany into one graph (figure 5). In this index, each representative office is weighted 
with one and each branch and each subsidiary is weighted with three. This weighting 
reflects their different functions, headcount and economic weight. Our results are robust 
with regard to other weightings. 
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Figure 5: Weighted presence of foreign banks 
Source: own database   18
The bold line describes the development of Frankfurt’s share of foreign banks in Germany. 
Indeed, there is an increasing concentration on Frankfurt up to the beginning of the 1980’s 
and after that a – more or less – steady decline. The concentration of foreign banks in 
Frankfurt follows an inverted ‘u’-shape, as predicted by NEG models. Remarkably, this is 
not directly correlated with the decreasing number of foreign banks – also weighted – in 
Germany (dotted line). The set up of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt was 
enthusiastically greeted by many local politicians for giving a new impetus to the future 
growth of the financial centre. Apart from a small blip though, nothing has happened in 
terms of locations of foreign banks. In retrospect, this is no surprise: The most important 
European central bank by far has long been in Frankfurt anyway – the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. Banks that want to be close to where European monetary policy is decided 
had to be in Frankfurt long since. 
As a robustness check and to clarify whether the decrease in concentration in Frankfurt is 
due to a concentration of activities in another financial centre in Germany or to a general 
spatial dispersion of foreign banks’ activities, a ‘Locational Herfindahl Index (LHI)’ is 
constructed. The LHI measures the sum of the squared shares of all foreign banks’ 
locations in Germany:  
 
with si,j as location i’s share of foreign banks’ total presence in Germany in year j. The LHI 
can take any value from 0 (no concentration) to 1 (all banks in one place). The ‘other’ 
locations have been disaggregated for this analysis. Three time series are displayed: The 
LHI for representative offices, the LHI for branches and subsidiaries and the LHI 
composite index that is constructed as before. The development of foreign banks’ LHI 
displays a similar picture as the development of the shares of Frankfurt (figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Locational Herfindahl Index of foreign banks 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
Again, there is a manifest ‘u’-shape of the concentration in time, as predicted by the New 
Economic Geography. As all indicators display roughly the same development, the weights 
associated with the different forms of foreign banks’ presence do not influence the overall 
result. Frankfurt’s historically low share of foreign banks today cannot be explained by the 
raise of one other centre, but is indeed due to a dispersion of activities within Germany. 
Starting in the 1950’s, foreign banks first tended to gather more and more in one place, i.e. 
Frankfurt. That development peaked in the beginning of the 80’s. As suggested, 
representative offices are an early indicator for the decreasing concentration in Frankfurt; 
subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks started to spread out more evenly across 
Germany later in the 1980’s.  
The locational pattern of foreign banks in Germany has been influenced by three broad 
developments: First, the absolute number of internationally active banks decreased 
worldwide, especially in the nineties. Mergers between banks (especially between US-
banks) lead to a reduction of the number of banks in Frankfurt. That does not, however, 
decrease the importance of Frankfurt as a financial centre. But some Japanese banks, which 
had been located in Frankfurt, cancelled their international business altogether in the 
aftermath of the Japanese financial crisis; the same holds true for Korean banks later on. 
Also many banks, again Japanese and Korean ones but also others, did concentrate their   20
European business to a large extent in London. These developments have hit Frankfurt 
more than other German financial centres.  
Second, the dispersion of foreign banks within Germany today is driven by regional 
business which is a symptom of stronger economic integration in Europe: Today, out of the 
eighteen banks from Austria thirteen are located in the southern part of Germany and five 
in Frankfurt. Eight Dutch banks are located in the western part of Germany, as are three out 
of six Belgian banks; Danish banks are exclusively located in the northern part of Germany, 
mostly in Hamburg, where also the only Norwegian bank resides. So, in parallel to the 
declining share of Frankfurt there is at least anecdotal evidence for regionalization of 
banking activities within Germany. This is in line with Wojcik (2002), who finds similar 
pattern for foreign shareholdings of German companies:  
‘The Dutch, Belgian and Swedish holders controlled companies located mainly in 
the north, including Berlin. The French, Austrian and Swiss entities held control 
mostly in the south, with Switzerland as the major source of foreign control in 
Baden-Württemberg, and Austria playing a similar role in Bavaria’ (Wojcik 2002, 
887).  
The strong manifestations of regional cross-country links are mirrored by the location of 
foreign banks: Spatial proximity seems again to be important. 
Third, these trends are to a large part contingent on the development of sophisticated 
information and telecommunication technologies. With the installation of computer-based 
trading, settlement and payment systems with remote access banks have been freed from 
the need to be present close to the major stock exchange, i.e. in Frankfurt (see Lo and Grote 
2002). The benefits of a large market, liquidity and low cost of infrastructure, do not 
require an on-site presence any more. The market can be accessed from any location 
anywhere in the world; the same holds true for access to most Euro payment systems within 
Europe. Thus, technology has decreased the need for on-site presence in many businesses, 
and with that a couple of benefits of being located in Frankfurt. That means that other 
places become relatively more beneficial for banks. They could, e.g. concentrate their 
business in London, or migrate closer towards their customers, as exemplified by the recent 
regional distribution of foreign banks in Germany. Grote (2002) reports that Japanese banks 
actually mention these technologies as enabling their concentration of activities in London. 
While clearly relocation to London is not driven by the search for lower wages or rents – as 
suggested by the New Economic Geography – the new technologies in banking make it 
possible to interact from a distance and can be interpreted as a lowering of ‘transportation’ 
costs.    21
Alonso-Villar (2005) shows that transportation costs that decline asymmetrically between 
upstream and downstream firms on the one hand and between customers and firms on the 
other hand, can lead to the results described above:  
‘Thus, if transport costs are significant, proximity to final demand represents the 
factor that determines spatial configuration and, therefore, the corresponding 
dispersion of economic activity, brought about by the dispersion of the population 
itself. For intermediate transport costs, vertical linkages make up spatial 
distribution, leading to the concentration of production’ (Alonso-Villar 2005). 
Our observations about a concentration of banking activities in London and a dispersion of 
activities within Germany are in line with declining ‘transportation’ costs in inter-firm 
linkages such as participation in trading and payment systems on the one hand and 
relatively constant costs in face-to-face interactions on the other. These interactions take 
place between customers and banks – which leads to dispersion in Germany – and between 
employees of the same bank which leads to a concentration in one place. Since London as 
the by far largest financial centre in Europe has many other advantages, banks concentrate 
their business there. 
 
6  Conclusion 
Foreign banks’ attraction to the financial centre Frankfurt within Germany varies over time. 
From 1949 to 2006 banks’ spatial distribution in Germany went from relative dispersion to 
a high degree of concentration in Frankfurt and to dispersion again. Thus, the concentration 
of foreign banks in Germany displays a significant ‘u’-shape development. This is in line 
with the prediction of new economic geography models that lower transportation costs lead 
to agglomeration first and to dispersion later. The paper is one of the first to document a 
‘u’-shaped locational development of a single industry. A small historical accident, the 
decision to locate the central bank in Frankfurt after World War II, influences the result of 
these processes to a great extent: Although a counterfactual speculation, it is probably fair 
to say that if Hamburg would have been chosen to host the central bank there would be no 
international financial centre Frankfurt today. Frankfurt gained its predominant position as 
a financial centre only in the 1960’s after a competition between several cities in a path-
dependent process. The locations of foreign banks in Germany are especially suited as an 
indicator for tracking financial centre development since most other German banks cannot 
move due to their status as local savings- or co-operative banks. Frankfurt’s share in 
foreign banks’ location is in decline since a couple of years. Two major trends are 
responsible for this: First, foreign banks have shifted offices to London and, second, more   22
foreign banks do locate closer to their customers – shown by banks from southern countries 
that locate predominantly in southern Germany, banks from northern countries 
predominantly in the northern part of Germany, and so on. Berlin, which was gaining share 
in foreign banks’ location only briefly after the reunification, is not a major driver of the 
declining importance of Frankfurt. Rather, foreign banks spread out to many other locations 
in Germany, as shown by the decrease in the Locational Herfindahl Index of bank 
concentration. 
Although the result – an (inverted) ‘u’-shape of foreign banks’ concentration in Germany 
over time – is predicted by a wealth of NEG models, we cannot infer that the suggested 
mechanisms actually are responsible for that development. Rather, face-to-face contacts to 
customers and to other bankers seem to drive foreign banks’ locational behaviour to a large 
extent. Over time, the reasons for locating in Frankfurt have changed. Many aspects of 
NEG models cannot be applied to single industry studies. Therefore we take the NEG 
hypothesis as a guideline for research rather than to trying to estimate the parameters of a 
specific model. Instead of high wages that drive banks out of the centre with further 
lowering transportation costs, it seems as if face-to-face contacts to clients matter more, as 
is shown by the concentration of banks in London and the localization of foreign banks 
close to their respective home countries in Germany.  
Frankfurt, as other financial centres in Europe, is under attack from two trends: Foreign 
banks either concentrate business in London, or disperse into the country (see Engelen, 
forthcoming, for related findings in an analysis of Amsterdam’s situation). For Frankfurt 
both developments spell a declining share of financial activities within Germany as well as 
within Europe. Note that this is not a statement on the development of any total number of 
banks on Frankfurt, which could very well increase despite these developments. A 
complete dispersion of activities in Germany is unlikely, since the traditional agglomeration 
factors infrastructure, labour market and spillovers still exist and not all business is able to 
be relocated to another country (Grote et al. 2002). Second tier European financial centres 
loose in relative importance for the provision of financial services. This does not spell the 
end of those centres, since there is a range of products for which local coordination between 
banks and within banks as well as local knowledge is key, as for national investment 
banking activities (see Wojcik 2005). But we might have seen the peak in the development 
of those second tier financial centres in Europe already.  
 
   23
References 
Alonso-Villar, O. (2005): The effects of transport costs revisited, Journal of Economic 
Geography, Vol. 5, pp. 589-604 
Arthur, W.B. (1994): Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press 
Association of German Banks (2005): The Top 100 German Banks, 
www.germanbanks.org, access on April 2, 2007 
Beaverstock, J. / Hoyler, M. / Pain, K. / Taylor P. (2006): In London's Long Shadow: 
Frankfurt in the European Space of Flows, in: M.M. Amen, K. Archer and M.M. 
Bosman (eds): Relocating Global Cities: From the Centre to the Margins Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 23-47 
Beaverstock, J. / Hoyler, M. / Pain, K. / Taylor P. (2001): Comparing London and Frankfurt 
as World cities. A relational study of contemporary urban change, Anglo-German 
foundation for Study of Industrial Society, London 
Boschma, R.A. and Frenken, K. (2006): Why is Geography not an Evolutionary Science? 
Towards an Evolutionary Economic Geography, Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 
6, pp. 273-302 
Boschma, R.A. and Lambooy, J.G. (1999): Evolutionary economics and economic 
geography, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 9, pp. 411-429 
Brakman, S. / Garretsen, H. / Schramm, M. (2006): Putting New Economic Geography to 
the Test: Free-ness of Trade and Agglomeration in the EU Regions, paper presented at 
the OenB Workshop on New Regional Economics in Central European Economies: The 
Future of Centreupe, March 30-31, 2006 
Brakman, S. / Garretsen, H. / Schramm, M. (2004): The strategic bombing of German cities 
during World War II and ist impact on city growth, Journal of Economic Geography, 
Vol. 4, pp. 201-218 
Brülhart, M. (1998): Economic Geography, Industry Location and Trade: The Evidence, 
The World Economy, Vol. 21(6), pp. 775-801  
Choi, S.R. / Park, D. / Tschoegl, A.E. (2002): Banks and the World's Major Banking 
Centres, 2000, Center for Financial Institutions Working Paper 02-36, Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania  
Choi, S.R. / Park, D. / Tschoegl, A.E. (1996): Banks and the World's Major Banking 
Centres, 1990, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 132, pp. 775-793   24
Choi, S.R. / Tschoegl, A.E. / Yu, C.M. (1986): Banks and the World's Major Financial 
Centres, 1970-1980, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 122, pp. 48-64 
Clark, G.L. and O'Connor, K. (1997): The Informational Content of Financial Products and 
the Spatial Structure of the Global Finance Industry, in: Kevin R. Cox (ed): Spaces of 
Globalization, London: Guilford Press, pp. 89-114 
David, P.A. (1997): Path dependence and the Quest for Historical Economics: One More 
Chorus of the Ballad of QWERTY, Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, 
Nr. 20, University of Oxford 
Der Volkswirt (1960): Der Zug nach Frankfurt, in: Der Volkswirt, Vol. 11, pp. 34-35 
Economists Advisory Group (1984). Regulation, competition and technology in the supply 
of financial services, chapter 4 of city 2000: The future of London as an international 
financial centre. London: Lafferty Publications, 37-55. Reprinted in R. Roberts (Ed., 
1994), International Financial Centres, I, 387-405, Aldershot: Elgar. 
Engelen, E. (forthcoming): ‘Amsterdamned’? – The uncertain future of a secondary 
financial center, Environment and Planning A 
Fattouh, B. (2000): Determinants of Banks' Location in the World's Major Financial 
Centres, Working Paper, Centre for Financial and Management Studies, University of 
London  
Faulconbridge, J.R. (2004): London and Frankfurt in Europe’s evolving financial centre 
network, Area, Vol. 36(3), pp. 235-244 
Friedmann, J. (1995): Where we stand: a decade of world city research, in: P.L. Knox and 
P.J. Taylor (eds.): World cities in a world system, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 21–47  
Fujita, M. / Krugman, P. / Venables, A.J. (1999): The Spatial Economy - Cities, Regions, 
and International Trade, Cambridge (MA) and London: MIT Press  
Gehrig, T. (1995): Korreferat zum Referat Norbert Schulz, in: Bernhard Gallen/Helmut 
Hesse/Hans Jürgen Ramser (eds.): Standort und Region, Tübingen: Mohr, pp. 79-81 
Goldberg, M.A. / Helsley, R.W. / Levi, M.D. (1988): On the Development of International 
Financial Centres, in: Annals of Regional Science, 22, pp. 81-94, reprinted in Richard 
Roberts (ed., 1994): International Financial Centres I, Aldershot: Elgar, pp. 81-94 
Grote, M.H. and Täube, F.A. (2006): Offshoring the Financial Services Industry: 
Implications for the Evolution of Indian IT Clusters, Environment and Planning A 38, 
pp. 1287-1305    25
Grote, M.H. (2002): Frankfurt - An Emerging International Financial Centre, in: D. 
Felsenstein, E.W. Schamp and A. Shachar (eds.): Emerging Nodes in the Global 
Economy. The Tel Aviv and Frankfurt Metropolitan Regions compared, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, pp. 81-107 
Grote, M.H. / Lo, V. / Harrschar-Ehrnborg, S. (2002): A value chain approach to financial 
centres – The case of Frankfurt, TESG Journal of Economic and Social Geography, 
Vol. 93(4), pp. 412-423 
Hackethal, A. (2004): German Banks and Banking Structure, in J.P. Krahnen and R.H. 
Schmidt (eds.) The German Financial System, Oxford University Press, pp. 71-105 
Hansmeyer, K.-H. (1998): Das Kreditwesen der deutschen Besatzungszonen (1945-1948), 
in: Hans Pohl (Hrsg.): Geschichte der deutschen Kreditwirtschaft seit 1945, Frankfurt: 
Knapp, pp. 1-22 
Harrschar-Ehrnborg, S. (2000): Finanzplatzstrukturen in Europa - die Entstehung und 
Entwicklung von Finanzzentren, Diss., Goethe-Universität Frankfurt 
Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1999): Finanzplatz Frankfurt, München: Beck 
Jeger, M. / Haegler, U. / Theiss, R. (1992): On the Attractiveness of International Financial 
Centres, in: Competitiveness in Banking, Heidelberg: Physica, pp. 239-272 
Junius, K. (1996): Economic Development and Industrial Concentration: An Inverted U-
Curve, Kiel Institute of World Economics, Working Paper No. 770 
Klagge, B. and Martin, R. (2005): Decentralized versus centralized financial systems: is 
there a case for local capital markets?, Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 5, pp. 387-
421 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1974): The Formation of Financial Centres: A Study in Comparative 
Economic History, in: Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 36, November 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1983): International Banks as Leaders or Followers of International 
Business, in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 7, pp. 583-595 
Krugman, P. (1998): What’s new about the New Economic Geography?, in: Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 14 (2), pp. 7-17 
Lambooy, J.G. and Boschma, R.A. (2001): Evolutionary economics and regional policy, 
Annals of Regional Science, Vol. 35, pp. 113-131 
Lee, R. and Schmidt-Marwede, U. (1993): Interurban competition? Financial centres and 
the geography of financial production, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, Vol. 17(4), pp. 492-515   26
Lo, V. and Grote, Michael H. (2002): Where traders go when stock exchanges go virtual – 
concentration, dissemination or persistence?, in: Morten Balling, Frank Lierman und 
Andrew Mullineux (eds): Technology and Finance: Challenges for financial markets, 
business strategies and policy makers, London: Routledge, pp. 190-203 
Martin, R. (1999): The new ‚geographical turn‘ in economics: some critical reflections, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 65-91 
Martin, R. and Sunley, P. (1996): Paul Krugman’s geographical economics and its 
implications for regional development theory. A critical assessment. Economic 
Geography, Vol. 72(3), pp. 259-292 
McCann, P. (2005): Transport costs and new economic geography, Journal of Economic 
Geography, Vol. 5, pp. 305-318 
McKinsey (2003): Letter to Bernd Fahrholz, Dresdner Bank, Frankfurt 
Neary, P.J. (2001): Of Hype and Hyperbolas: Introducing the New Economic Geography, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), pp. 536-561 
Nelson, R. R. (1994): The Co-Evolution of Technology, Industrial Structure, and 
Supporting Institutions, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 3(1), pp. 47-63 
O’Brien, R. (1992): Global financial integration: The end of geography, London: Pinter 
Ottaviano, G.I.P. and Puga, D. (1998): Agglomeration in the Global Economy: A Survey of 
the ‘New Economic Geography’, The World Economy, Vol. 21(6), pp. 707-731 
Poon, J.P.H. (2003): Hierarchical Tendencies of Capital Markets Among International 
Financial Centres, Growth and Change, Vol. 34(2), pp. 135-156 
Poon, J.P.H. / Eldredge, B. / Yeung, D. (2004): Rank Size Distribution of International 
Financial Centres, International Regional Science Review, Vol. 27(4), pp. 411-430 
Porteous, D. (1999): The Development of Financial Centres: Location, Information 
Externalities and Path Dependence, in: Ron Martin (ed.): Money and the Space 
Economy, Chichester: Wiley, pp. 95-137 
Puga, D. (1999): The rise and fall of regional inequalities, European Economic Review, 
Vol. 43, pp. 303-334 
Reed, H.C. (1988): Financial Centre Hegemony, Interest Rates, and the Global Political 
Economy, in: Y.S. Park and M. Essayyad (eds.): International Banking and Financial 
Centres, Boston et al.: Kluwer, pp. 247-268 
Reed, H.C. (1981): The Preeminence of International Financial Centres, New York: 
Praeger   27
Reed, H.C. (1980): The Ascent of Tokyo as an International Financial Centre, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 11(3), pp. 19-35 
Sassen, S. (1999): Global Financial Centres, Foreign Affairs Vol. 78 (1), pp. 75-87 
Schmidt, R.H. and Tyrell, M. (2004): What constitutes a financial system in general and the 
German financial system in particular?, in J.P. Krahnen and R.H. Schmidt (eds.): The 
German Financial System, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 19-67 
Smith, W.D. (1984): The function of commercial centres in the modernization of European 
capitalism: Amsterdam as an information exchange in the seventeenth century. Journal 
of Economic History, XLIV (4), December, pp. 985-1005, reprinted in R. Roberts (ed., 
1994). International Financial Centres, I, 269-289, Aldershot: Elgar. 
Tabuchi, T. (1998): Urban Agglomeration and Dispersion: A Synthesis of Alonso and 
Krugman, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 44, pp. 333-351 
Tabuchi, T. and Thisse, J.-F. (2001): Labor Mobility and Economic Geography, Discussion 
Paper CIRJE-F-99, University of Tokyo 
Ter Hart, H.W. and Piersma, J. (1990): Direct Representation in international financial 
markets: The case of foreign banks in Amsterdam, TESG Journal of Economic and 
Social Geography, Vol. 81(2), pp. 82-92 
Thrift, N. (1994): On the Social and Cultural Determinants of International Financial 
Centres: the Case of the City of London, in: S. Corbridge / N. Thrift / R. Martin (eds): 
Money, Power and Space, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 327-355 
Tschoegl, A.E. (2000): International Banking Centres, Geography, and Foreign Banks, 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, Vol. 9 (1), pp. 1-32 
Walter, I. (1998): Globalization of Markets and Financial Centre Competition, paper 
presented at the conference on ‘Challenges for Highly Developed Countries in the 
Global Economy’, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, March 20, 1998 
Wojcik, D. (2005): Geography and future of stock exchanges: between real and virtual 
space, Jesus College, Oxford, mimeo 
Wojcik, D. (2002):  The Länder are the Building Blocks of the German Capital Market, 
Regional Studies, Vol. 36(8), pp. 877-895 
Wolf, H. (1998a): Von der Währungsreform bis zum Großbankengesetz (1948-1952), in: 
H. Pohl (ed.): Geschichte der deutschen Kreditwirtschaft seit 1945, Frankfurt: Knapp, 
pp. 59-110   28
Wolf, H. (1998b): Vom Großbankengesetz bis zur ‘Normalisierung’ (1953-1958), in: Hans 
Pohl (ed.): Geschichte der deutschen Kreditwirtschaft seit 1945, Frankfurt: Knapp, pp. 
111-149  
 
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting 
 
No.176:  Marcel Marekwica / Raimond Maurer, How unobservable Bond Positions in 
Retirement Accounts affect Asset Allocation, März 2007 
No.175:  Reint Gropp / Marco Lo Duca / Jukka Vesala, Cross-Border Bank Contagion 
in Europe, Februar 2007 
No.174:  Wolfram J. Horneff / Raimond Maurer / Michael Stamos, Optimal Gradual 
Annuitization: Quantifying the Costs of Switching to Annuities, Februar 2007 
No.173:  Reint Gropp / Arjan Kadareja, Stale information, shocks and volatility, 
Februar 2007 
No.172:  Michael H. Grote / Florian Kube / Michael Küchen, „Home, sweet home“-   
Die Entwicklung des Handelsvolumens deutscher Aktien im Ausland, Dezember 
2006  
No.171:  Christina E. Bannier/ Dennis N. Hänsel, Determinants of Banks' Engagement 
in Loan Securitization, October 2006 
No.170:  Marcel Marekwica/ Raimond Maurer, Proof that it is not always optimal to 
locate bonds in a tax-deferred Account, September 2006 
No.169:  Marcel Marekwica/ Raimond Maurer/ Steffen Sebastian, Asset Meltdown – 
Fact or Fiction?, August 2006 
No.168:  Steffen Sebastian/ Marcel Tyrell, Open-End Real Estate Funds: Danger or 
Diamond?, May 2006 
No.167:  Grigori Feiguine, Rentenreform in Russland – heutiger Stand und 
Entwicklungsperspektiven im internationalen Vergleich, May 2006 
No.166:  Tatiana Sedash, Mutual Fund Investing – One of the Main Ways of Saving for 
Retirement in Russia, May 2006 
No.165:  Christina E. Bannier (geb. Metz)/ Falko Fecht/ Marcel Tyrell, Open-End 
Real Estate Funds in Germany – Genesis and Crises, May 2006 
No.164:  Jan Pieter Krahnen, Die Stabilität von Finanzmärkten: Wie kann die 
Wirtschaftspolitik Vertrauen schaffen?, May 2006  
No.163:  Patrick Behr/ André Güttler, Does the Stock Market React to Unsolicited 
Ratings?, April 2006 
No.162:  Reinhard H. Schmidt, Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität 
der Corporate Governance in Deutschland, March 2006 
No.161:  Michael H. Grote/ Marc Umber,  Home biased? A Spatial Analysis of the 
Domestic Merging Behavior of US Firms, February 2006 
No.160:  Christina E. Bannier (geb. Metz)/ Marcel Tyrell,  Modelling the Role of 
Credit Rating Agencies - Do They Spark off a Virtuous Circle?, November 2005 
No.159:  Rolf Reichardt, Kapitalmarktorientierte Risikosteuerung in Banken: 
Marktwertsteuerung statt Marktzinsmethode, October 2005 
For a complete list of working papers please visit 
www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de 